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Deep Learning \square reinforcement learning \square
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First, if scientists have tried, and failed, to come up with an alternative theory that explains a phenomenon well, that counts as evidence in favor of the original theory. Second, if a theory keeps seeming like a better idea the more you study it, that's another plus-one. And if a line of thought produced a theory that evidence later supported, chances are it will again.

□□□□□□ Are there really many worlds in the "Many-worlds interpretation" of Quantum Mechanics?□□□the development of «decoherence theory» revealed that, using the standard formalism of quantum mechanics, macroscopically distinct branches of the wavefunction were almost entirely free from interference and evolve approximately classically□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
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Robert McNamara

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$\verb McNamara fallacy Label{lacy} https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McNamara_fallacy label{lacy} label{lac$
The McNamara fallacy (also known as the quantitative fallacy[1]), named for Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968, involves making a decision based solely on quantitative observations (or metrics) and ignoring all others. The reason given is often that these other observations cannot be proven.
The first step is to measure whatever can be easily measured. This is OK as far as it goes. The second step is to disregard that which can't be easily measured or to give it an arbitrary quantitative value. This is artificial and misleading. The third step is to presume that what can't be measured easily really isn't important. This is blindness. The fourth step is to say that what can't be easily measured really doesn't exist. This is suicide.
□□ McNamara's War□□ □ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_McNamara#Vietnam_War□
In April 1964, Senator Wayne Morse called the war "McNamara's War".[82] In response, McNamara told the press that he was honored, saying "I think it is a very important war, and I am pleased to be identified with it and do whatever I can to win it".[83]
McNamara's hawkish stance on Vietnam was well known in Washington and many in the press often referred to the war as "McNamara's war" as he was the one in the cabinet always pressing for greater American involvement.
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